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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Court of Appeals of Utah has jurisdiction of this 
appeal under §78-2a-3(2)(j) (U.C.A. 1986). This is a matter 
assigned to the Court of Appeals by the Supreme Court and 
principally involves a question whether the prior inter-
pretation of a contract by this Court in an earlier appeal of 
this case became the law of the case and therefore foreclosed a 
different interpretation of the contract by the trial court on 
remand. Upon remand, the trial court refused Dixie's request 
to reinterpret the contract but instead followed this Court's 
mandate in the earlier decision to determine the value of 
Dixie's non-sale efforts under quantum meruit. In this appeal 
Dixie asserts that the trial court improperly refused to 
reinterpret the contract and improperly calculated under 
quantum meruit the amount the trial court awarded for Dixie's 
non-sale efforts under an implied in fact contract. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Although Dixie's brief states three issues, the first 
two appear to be substantially included within the question 
concerning the scope of the law of the case doctrine. It is 
submitted that the following two issues include all substantive 
questions on appeal. 
I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT, AS REQUIRED BY THE LAW 
OF THE CASE ESTABLISHED IN THIS COURT'S PRIOR OPINION, 
CORRECTLY REFUSED TO REINTERPRET THE PARTIES' AGREEMENT. 
Applicable Standard of Review: Lower court judgments 
rendered as a matter of law are subject to appellate review 
without giving deference to the lower courts conclusion. Ron 
Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 
1382 (Utah 1987). 
II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CALCULATED 
THE AMOUNT DIXIE WAS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE FOR ITS SERVICES 
UNDER QUANTUM MERUIT AS REQUIRED BY THIS COURT'S PRIOR 
OPINION. 
Applicable Standard of Review; Lower court judgments 
rendered as a matter of law are subject to appellate review 
without giving deference to the lower court's conclusion. Ron 
Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 
1382 (Utah 1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Dixie's appeal herein follows a trial on remand 
required by this Court's prior decision solely to determine 
under quantum meruit the value of Dixie's non-sale services 
under an implied in fact contract. At the remand trial the 
2 
trial court determined that it was subject to the law of the 
case established by this Court and refused to reinterpret the 
parties' agreement which had been extensively reviewed by this 
Court in its earlier decision. After receiving conflicting 
evidence from the parties concerning the value in quantum 
meruit of Dixie's non-sale efforts, the trial court found that 
Dixie was entitled to receive $3 6,000 for such efforts. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. In March, 1980 Scheller entered into a written 
agreement wherein Dixie agreed to subdivide, develop and market 
Scheller's property. (R. 72) 
2. Thereafter, in a single sale Dixie sold the entire 
property without subdividing or developing but claimed that 
Dixie was nonetheless entitled to one-half of the "profits" 
under the agreement. (R. 3) 
3. Scheller then commenced this action to prevent such 
allocation because Dixie had not subdivided and developed the 
property. (R. 2) 
4. After the lower court ruled for Dixie in 1985, 
Scheller appealed to the Utah Supreme Court which assigned the 
appeal to this Court. (R. 129, 139) 
5. On appeal, this Court extensively reviewed the 
parties' agreement, and then affirmed the trial court's award 
to Dixie of a sales commission of $72,600 and out-of-pocket 
expenses of $77,761 under the agreement but reversed in regard 
to the allocation of on of the "profits" to Dixie because 
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Dixie had not subdivided, developed and marketed the property 
and remanded solely for determination of the value and award in 
quantum meruit for Dixie's non-sale services. (R. 3 30) 
Scheller v. Dixie Six Corporation, 753 P.2d 971 (Utah App. 
1988). 
6. Following this Court's earlier decision, Dixie 
petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari 
which was denied. (R. 431 T. Vol. I 156) 
7. Thereafter, in the trial on remand, Judge Russon 
refused Dixie's request to reinterpret the agreement on the 
ground that he was subject to the law of the case established 
by this Court's decision to remand solely to determine the 
value under quantum meruit of Dixie's non-sale efforts. 
(R. 431, T. Vol. I, p. 156) 
8. Byron Parker (R. 431, T. Vol. I, p. 15), Jerry 
Webber (R. 431, T. Vol. I, p. 113), and Richard Moffit (R. 431, 
T. Vol. I, p. 148) testified for Dixie at the remand trial as 
to the value of Dixie's non-sale efforts. 
9. Mr. Parker, Dixie's project manager, testified that 
he kept no records of the time he spent on the partnership's 
project or specifically the conditional use permit. He also 
admitted that the R-M zoning had previously been obtained by 
Scheller and not by Dixie and that the Buyer of the property, 
Busch Development, did not use the plans or the conditional use 
permit obtained by Dixie but Busch obtained its own plans and 
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conditional use permit. (R. 431, See T. Vol. I, pp. 68, 71-72, 
75-78). 
10. Mr. Webber, Dixie's real estate expert, admitted 
he did not know how long it would take or how much it would 
cost to obtain a conditional use permit. He also admitted he 
did not know what its value would be. (R. 431, T. Vol. I, pp. 
133, 142). 
11. Mr. Moffit, Dixie's development expert, testified 
that he did not know how much time Dixie spent in obtaining 
plans and governmental approval for a conditional use permit. 
(R. 432, T. Vol. II, p. 24). 
12 • Scheller's development expert, Mr. Charles Davis, 
testified that the efforts performed by Dixie are typically not 
calculated separately but are usually included as a portion of 
the services rendered in earning the sales commission on the 
sale. He also testified that any additional efforts in obtain-
ing a conditional use permit should have taken only 20 to 40 
hours and would have been charged out in the period 1980 to 
1982 at the rate of $50.00 to $75.00 an hour. (R. 432, T. Vol. 
II, pp. 48-49). 
13. After taking conflicting evidence from both 
parties Judge Russon determined that the value of Dixie's non-
sales efforts in quantum meruit was $36,000 and that Scheller 
should receive the balance of the sale proceeds claimed by 
Dixie. (R. 416). 
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14. Dixie kept $301,439.52 as its share of the 
"profits" in addition to the expenses of $77,026.11 and a sales 
commission of $72,600.00. (Defendant's Exh. 19). 
15 # Under Judge Russon's order, Scheller is entitled 
to receive the balance of the sales proceeds; $301,439.52 plus 
interest thereon less the $36,000.00. (R. 416) 
16. Dixie appealed Judge Russon's decision to the Utah 
Supreme Court which again assigned the case to this Court. 
(R. 418) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This Court's earlier, express and extensive opinion 
interpreting the parties' written agreement became the law of 
the case which controls all subsequent proceedings in the case 
in that regard. Dixie is not entitled to have this Court 
reinterpret the agreement in Dixie's favor. 
The application of quantum meruit in this case requires 
that there be a review of past services to determine their 
reasonable market value without reference to what the parties 
might theoretically have agreed as to the value of such ser-
vices prior to the time the services were rendered. The trial 
court correctly applied quantum meruit under the situation of 
an implied in fact contract. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. AS REQUIRED BY THE LAW OF THE CASE ES-
TABLISHED BY THIS COURT'S EARLIER OPINION, THE 
TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO REINTERPRET 
THE AGREEMENT. 
The prior express interpretation of the written agree-
ment and the ruling by this Court based on such interpretation 
is the law of the case and is thereafter binding on all subse-
quent proceedings in this case. See Corbett v. Fitzgerald, 
709 P.2d 384 (Utah 1985); C & J Industries, Inc. v. Bailev, 669 
P.2d 855 (Utah 1983). 
In its brief, Dixie has cited two cases from other 
jurisdictions, Major v. Benton, 647 F.2d 110 (10th Cir. 1981); 
and Searle v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 676 P.2d 1308 (Cal. 
1985), to the effect that the law of the case is not 
"inflexible" and may be disregarded to avoid an unjust result. 
In both the Major and Searle cases, however, the appellate 
court determined that the issue was not restricted by the law 
of the case rule because the issue involved therein was either 
not considered in the lower court's decision or there had been 
a misapplication of existing principles by the lower court. 
Neither of such factors is present in this case. 
A widely followed explanation of the law of the case 
rule is contained in White v. Murtha, 377 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 
1967), a portion of which explanation this Court cited in 
Conder v. A. L. Williams & Associates, Inc., 739 P.2d 634 (Utah 
App. 1987). The White decision stated the rule at 377 F.2d 431 
as follows: 
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The "law of the case" rule is based on the salutary and 
sound public policy that litigation should come to an end. 
It is predicated on the premise that "there would be no end 
to a suit if every obstinate litigant could, by repeated 
appeals, compel a court to listen to criticisms on their 
opinions or speculate of chances from changes in its mem-
bers," and that it would be impossible for an appellate 
court "to perform its duties satisfactorily and efficiently" 
and expeditiously "if a question, once considered and 
decided by it were to be litigated anew in the same case 
upon any and every subsequent appeal" thereof. 
While the "law of the case" doctrine is not an inex-
orable command, a decision of a legal issue or issues by an 
appellate court establishes the "law of the case" and must 
be followed in all subsequent proceedings in the same case 
in the trial court or on a later appeal in the appellate 
court, unless the evidence on a subsequent trial was sub-
stantially different, controlling authority has since made a 
contrary decision of the law applicable to such issues, or 
the decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest 
injustice. (Emphasis added.) 
In its earlier published decision in this case this 
Court expressly interpreted the parties' agreement and dis-
cussed cit length the question whether Dixie was entitled under 
the provisions of the agreement to take one-half of the 
"profits" in spite of the fact that Dixie had not subdivided or 
developed the property as was required by the agreement. 
Because there was a full review of the agreement by 
this Court in its earlier decision, any further review of the 
agreement was foreclosed. In addition, this Court remanded 
only to determine under quantum meruit in regard to a contract 
implied in fact the reasonable value of Dixie's non-sale 
efforts. Under those circumstances, the trial court properly 
refused to reinterpret the parties' agreement under the law of 
the case doctrine. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CALCULATED THE 
AMOUNT DIXIE WAS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE FOR ITS 
SERVICES UNDER QUANTUM MERUIT AS REQUIRED BY 
THIS COURT'S PRIOR OPINION. 
In reviewing the agreement between the parties, this 
Court in its earlier decision determined that "no contract 
existed as to the allocation of proceeds in the event the prop-
erty was sold undeveloped" and that the conduct of the parties 
established a contract "implied in fact as to the allocation of 
the proceeds if the property was sold prior to development." 
Scheller v. Dixie Six Corp., 753 P.2d 971, 975 (Utah App. 
1988) . 
In its earlier decision, this Court cited its opinion 
in Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), wherein 
it explained the measure of damages under quantum meruit in an 
implied in fact contract situation such as in this case. In 
Davies, this Court followed the general rule that when the 
parties have left the amount of the compensation unexpressed, 
"courts will infer that the parties intended the amount to be 
the reasonable market value of the . . . services." 746 P.2d 
at 269. 
In its earlier opinion herein, this Court determined 
that Dixie was entitled to recover in quantum meruit for the 
reasonable value of its non-sale efforts such as acquiring 
plans and obtaining governmental approval in anticipation of 
development. This Court then remanded to the trial court the 
sole question of determining the value of Dixie's non-sale 
efforts in that regard. 
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At the remand trial Dixie's manager acknowledged that 
Scheller had already obtained the necessary R-M zoning before 
Dixie was involved. In addition, Busch Development, who pur-
chased the undeveloped property from Dixie, obtained its own 
conditional use permit and plans. In fact, much of the negoti-
ation for governmental approval for the conditional use permit 
obtained by Dixie, (which permit was not used by Busch), was 
performed by independent architectural and engineering firms 
whose compensation was included in the expenses for which Dixie 
was paid by Scheller. (R. 431, T. Vol. I, p. 72-73) 
On the other side, Scheller's development expert, 
Charles Davis, testified that the efforts performed by Dixie 
are typically included in the services performed in earning the 
sales commission, (which Dixie has also already received). He 
further testified that any additional efforts in obtaining a 
conditional use permit, even if arranged to be paid for 
separately, should have taken only 20 to 40 hours and would 
have cost $50.00 to $75.00 an hour during the period 1980 to 
1982. 
On the conflicting evidence regarding the market value 
of Dixie's actual non-sale efforts, the trial court on remand 
determined that the value of such non-sale efforts was $36,000. 
The trial court correctly applied quantum meruit as stated by 
this Court. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court, as required by the law of this case 
established by this Court in its prior decision, correctly 
restricted the remand proceedings to a consideration of 
testimony and evidence regarding the market value of Dixie's 
non-sale efforts. On disputed evidence, the trial court, as 
finder of fact, properly applied the doctrine of quantum meruit 
set forth in this Court's prior opinion in its ruling that the 
value of Dixie's non-sale efforts was $36,000. There are no 
grounds for upsetting the trial court's decision. Moreover, 
the trial court further held, pursuant to this Court's prior 
decision, that Scheller is entitled to the balance of the sale 
proceeds plus interest and Dixie should be ordered to forthwith 
account for and disburse to Scheller those amounts. 
A Respectfully submitted this /Q day of July, 1991. 
M l g±£-
WALTER P. FABER, JR. 
RICHARD M. MATHESON 
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Ii«I\\L iIIX CORPORATION, D i f < ft lai t 
and Respondent 
No. 860147-CA. 
Court of Appeals of I Its I'l 
April 25, 1988. 
Limited partners in real estate limited 
partnership filed suit seeking declaratory 
judgment limiting general partner to recov-
ery of its expenses plus 6% sales commis-
sion for sale of undeveloped partnership 
property. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Dean E. Conder, J., conclud-
ed that limited partners were estopped 
from claiming that general partner had not 
performed in accordance with partnership 
agreement, and limited partners appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that 
(1) limited partners were not estopped by 
their actions from asserting that general 
partner did not perform as provided under 
agreement; (2) "develop" within meaning 
of partnership agreement meant build, and 
agreement did not contemplate sale of 
property without development; and (8) par-
ties' conduct established contract implied in 
XIE SIX CORI Utah , Q J | 
(UuhApp. m t ) 
fact as to allocation of proceeds if property 
was sold prior to development, and general 
partner was entitled, to recovery in quan-
tum meruit for reasonable value of its. non-
sale efforts. 
,{fiTied in part, rev e rat*} ami re-
'.anded r . m -
1 . ' ' ( i i i t i » ' n m , &~a ir»3 
w. mi ted partners in real P statue !im:'.j«T 
^rsrui who contended mat gent--a' 
r
 - r^r : \ i share equally .ri pnr \-
)f property was only tri^gerec * 
- developed, u - - j . 
-«nng genpr. 
2 Partnership «=*366 
"Develop," within meaning of real es-
tate limited partnership agreement that 
provided that purpose of partnership was 
to develop property, meant build, and divi-
sion of profits upon sale of property before 
any building had taken place could not be 
determined by reference to a g r e e m e n t 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial, constructions and 
definitions. 
3 . Partnership *»3S€ 
Conduct of parties to real estate limit-
ed partnership agreement that provided 
that purpose of partnership w a s to develop 
property established contract implied in 
fact a s to allocation of proceeds if property 
w a s sold prior to development, and general 
partner w a s entitled to recovery in quan-
t u m meruit for reasonable value of i ts non-
sa le efforts; limited partners requested 
general partner to perform work of devel-
oping property and general partner clearly 
expected to be compensated for a u d i ser-
vices , and limited partners knew or should 
have known that general partner expected 
compensation beyond sales commission it 
would receive for just sel l ing property. 
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Walter P. Faber, Jr., Watkina & Faber, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and appel-
lant!. 
Craig G. Adamson (argued), Mark A. 
Laraen, Lawrence K. Hurleas, Dart, Adam-
son, and Parken, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and respondent 
Before BILLINGS, GARFF, and 
ORME, JJ. 
OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
Appellants Scheller and Tollstrup appeal 
from a judgment awarding defendant Dixie 
Six Corporation what they contend is an 
excessive distribution pursuant to a limited 
partnership agreement between the par-
ties. We reverse in part and remand. 
Facts 
Vivian Scheller and her son Steven 
Tollstrup ("Scheller"), owned approximate-
ly twenty-four acres of property in Salt 
Lake County which they intended to have 
developed to produce long-term income. In 
the spring of 1979, Mrs. Scheller ap-
proached Hal Larsen, an officer of Dixie 
Six Corporation, about working with her 
and her son to develop the property. On 
March 3, 1980, the parties formed a limited 
partnership known as D.S.T., Ltd., with 
Dixie Six as the general partner and Mrs. 
Scheller and her son as limited partners. 
Pursuant to the limited partnership agree-
ment, Dixie Six contributed $10,000 toward 
the initial capital and Scheller conveyed the 
property to D.S.T. 
The partnership agreement provided that 
the purpose of the partnership was to "sub-
divide, develop and market" the property. 
The words "subdivide, develop and market" 
were left undefined. The agreement con-
tained a formula for the allocation of the 
partnership's receipts, which may be sum-
marized as follows: 
(a) First, to reimburse the actual ex-
penses relative to the subdividing, de-
1. Articles IV and XIV of the agreement required 
Dixie Six, at one of it* obligation*, to obtain 
velopment, improvement and sale of 
the property, 
(b) Second, to payment to the Limited 
Partners for the real property, calcu-
lated at $30,000 per acre. 
(c) Third, one-half of the remainder to 
Dixie Six and one-half of the remain-
der to the Limited Partner* 
In addition, the agreement provided that 
Dixie Six could charge the partnership a 
real estate commission not exceeding 6% of 
the sales price of the property and, further, 
that Dixie Six had the unqualified right to 
sell the property at any time. 
Following the signing of the agreement, 
Dixie Six hired Western Design, which be-
gan preparing plans, plats, and studies, and 
sought governmental approval to build an 
apartment and commercial complex on the 
site. 
In April 1981, D.S.T. sold 1.2 acres of the 
property to Marvin Hendrickson, an officer 
and shareholder in Dixie Six, for $36,000.00 
and in February 1982, D.S.T. sold an addi-
tional 0.75 acres to Hendrickson. In both 
transactions, D.S.T. took no sales commis-
sion or other distribution and paid all of the 
proceeds to Scheller. 
Once the plans for improvement on the 
site were completed in the fall of 1982, 
Dixie Six attempted to get financing for 
the project but was unsuccessful.1 During 
this time, D.S.T. received an offer from 
P.F. West to purchase the remaining prop-
erty. Dixie Six sought Scheller's consent 
to the proposed sale to P.F. West and 
Scheller consented, but the sale was never 
completed. Dixie Six subsequently discon-
tinued its efforts to locate and obtain fi-
nancing. Dixie Six then caused the remain-
ing partnership property to be sold to 
Busch P« velopment on June 30, 1983, for a 
sum in excess of $1.2 million. 
Prior to the sale of the property, Dixie 
Six informed Scheller that it intended to 
divide the proceeds from the sale according 
to the formula set forth in the partnership 
financing. 
SCHELLER •. 1 
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if! cement1 Scheller objected to allocation 
of the proceeds on that basis. The sale 
was concluded without the allocation issue 
having been resolved. On September 23, 
1988 Scheller filed suit in district court 
seeking a declaratory judgment limiting 
Dixie Six to the recovery of its expenses 
plus the 6% sales commission for the sale 
< f the property and to prohibit Dixie Six 
from sharing in the profit of the sale as set 
forth in the partnership agreement 
The trial court found that the partner-
ship agreement did not define the words 
"subdivide, develop, and market" and con-
cluded that Dixie Six did not violate the 
agreement by selling the property. The 
court also concluded that Scheller was es-
topped from claiming that Dixie Six had 
not performed in accordance with the con-
tract because Scheller had knowledge of, 
and in fact acquiesced and approved of, all 
sales of the property. In addition, the 
court found that it would be inequitable to 
allow Scheller to accept the efforts of Dixie 
Six without allowing Dixie Six to recover as 
provided in the contract Since the parties 
had expressly provided no alternative meth-
od of compensating Dixie Six for its servic-
es, the court found the formula as set forth 
in the partnership agreement to be enforce-
able. 
Scheller argues that Dixie Six. was not 
entitled to a full share of the profits. f"i c m 
the sale of the property because it sold the 
property without "developing" it as re-
quired by the agreement Scheller ac-
knowledges that while Dixie Six had the 
unqualified right to sell the property at any 
time, a right Scheller contends was given 
primarily for tax purposes, it had the obli-
gation to "subdivide, develop and market" 
the property. Thus, Dixie Six's right to 
share in the proceeds according to the for-
mula set forth in the :> -reement was con-
tingent upon its fulfilling its obligation to 
"subdivide, develop and market" the prop-
ertj 
The trial court did not reach the issue of 
the meaning of the term "develop" as used 
XIE six CORP. ttafctfn 
iii the agreement because it determined 
that Scheller was "estopped" from taking 
the position that Dixie Six had not per-
formed as provided in the contract We 
find Scheller's conduct does not constitute 
estoppel. 
Estoppel 
[1] Tlie elements, of estoppel are: ' con-
duct by one party which leads another par-
ty, in reliance thereon, to adopt a course of 
action resulting in detriment or damage if 
the first party is permitted to repudiate his 
conduct" Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226, 
1230, (Utah CtApp. 1988) (quoting Black-
hurst v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 
688, 691 (Utah 1985)). The trial court con-
cluded that appellants were estopped from 
asserting that Dixie Six could not sell the 
property unless it was "developed" because 
Scheller had knowledge of, acquiesced,, in, 
and approved of the two minor sales of 
property to Marvin Hendrickson and the 
proposed sale to P.F. West *11 without any 
development having taken place. However, 
the trial court's conclusion confuses Schei-
e ' s position concerning sale of the proper-
ty with Scheller's position concerning the 
allocation of proceeds upon sale. 
Scheller has not asserted that Dixie Six 
could not sell the property unless it was 
"developed" as anticipated under the 
agreement but only that Dixie Six was not 
entitled to a full share of the proceeds for 
the sale of property unless it satisfied its 
obligations under the contract Scheller's 
approval of the first two sales of property 
do not constitute an estoppel from objects 
ing to the allocation of proceeds from the 
Busch sale for two reasons. First the 
earlier sales of property, combined, consti-
tuted only 1.95 acres out of the total 24 
acres owned by D.S.T. and involved land 
that was never intended for development 
Second, Dixie Six took no sales commis-
sions on these transactions and paid all the 
proceeds to Scheller. Therefore, Scheller 
2. In their complaint, Scheller alio claimed that 
Dixie Six had demanded a commission of 19% 
rather than the 6H provided in the agreement 
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had no reason to complain about the alloca-
tion of proceeds. 
Nor can Scheller's approval of the pro-
posed P.F. West sale form the basis of an 
estoppel from objecting to the allocation of 
proceeds from the Busch sale. The P.F. 
West sale was never completed and there 
were no proceeds to allocate. Thus, Schel-
ler's failure to object to the allocation of 
proceeds from two sales in which Dixie Six 
took no proceeds and one proposed sale 
which never reached the point of allocation, 
is not conduct that could reasonably lead 
Dixie Six to believe that Scheller would not 
object to its claiming a full share of pro-
ceeds in the event of a consummated sale 
of undeveloped property. Any uncertainty 
in this regard was resolved when, nearly 
two months prior to closing of the Busch 
sale, Scheller's counsel wrote Dixie Six ob-
jecting to use of the agreement's formula 
for allocating sale proceeds if the property 
were sold undeveloped. 
We hold that the trial court erred in 
concluding that Scheller was estopped by 
its own actions from asserting that Dixie 
Six did not perform as provided in the 
contract Because the trial court; decided 
the case on a theory of estoppel, it was not 
necessary for it to reach what we view as 
the pivotal issue in this case, namely the 
meaning of the term "develop" as used in 
the agreement Since we find that Schel-
ler's conduct did not give rise to an estop-
pel, the exact meaning of the term is crit-
ical. 
"Subdivide, Develop and Market" 
[2] Generally, the term "develop," 
when used in connection with real estate, is 
interpreted to mean "the converting of a 
tract of land into an area suitable for resi-
dential or business uses." Prince George'* 
County v. Equitable Trust Co., Inc., 44 
MdApp. 272,408 A.2d 787,742 (1979). Ac-
cord, Muirhead v. Pilot Properties, Inc., 
268 So.2d 282, 288 (Miss.1972). Similarly, 
the word "developer," in common parlance, 
means "a person who develops real estate; 
1* Aasuminc that "develop" means "build," uncer-
tainty remains as to what was to be built: a 
church, a race track, hornet, a laundromat, or 
often: one that improves and subdivides 
land and builds and sells residential struc-
tures thereon." Webster's Third New In-
ternational Dictionary 618 (1986). 
The parties' agreement states in Article 
II that the purpose of the partnership is to 
"subdivide, develop, and market" the prop-
erty. The use of these termb, or some 
variation, throughout the agreement, is 
consistent with the interpretation that "de-
velop" means to build. For example, Arti-
cle VI, with our emphasis, states as fol-
lows: 
In addition thereto, Dixie shall contribute 
its expertise for the purpose of subdivid-
ing, developing and marketing the prop-
erty; shall provide or obtain all equip-
menU machinery and personnel neces-
sary for such subdivision, development 
and marketing; and shall obtain the nec-
essary and sufficient financing for such 
subdivision, development and marketing, 
using the property as security thereof. 
Viewing the contract as a whole, we 
would have little difficulty in concluding, as 
a matter of law, that the term "develop" as 
used in this agreement means "build." * 
Equipment, machinery, and secured lend-
ing suggest construction, not the mere 
planning, surveying, studying, and apprais-
ing which Dixie Six contends satisfied the 
obligation to "develop" the property. 
However, even if there is some ambiguity 
concerning what the parties intended when 
using the term "develop," the evidence 
compels the conclusion that the parties in-
tended to mean "build." The formula allo-
cating a full 60% of the net proceeds to 
Dixie Six is itself indicative of that result 
If all Scheller anticipated was the sale of 
the property, it would have hired a real 
estate agent and paid the standard real 
estate commission. Common sense dic-
tates that one does not offer someone half 
of the net profit on the sale of property for 
simply serving as an agent to sell property. 
More importantly, the prior discussions 
and negotiations between the parties and 
their course of conduct assumed actual 
even roadways, curbs, and gutters? Such uncer-
tainty is inconsequential in *4judic*tins the par-
ties' rights where nothing whatever was built 
building on the property 
found that Dixie Six sought government 
approval for ''the building of an apartment 
and commercial complex on the site." The 
court also found that prior to forming the 
partnership, the parties met on the site of 
the property and "discussed possible types 
and configurations of buildinp which 
might fit on the land." 
The parties' agreement contemplated the 
development of the property and did not 
anticipate the sale of the property undevel-
oped. Accordingly, the payment formula 
was premised on the sale of developed 
property. So certain were the parties that 
the property would be developed that they 
never contemplated a formula for the allo-
cation of proceeds in the event of a sale of 
undeveloped property. Thus, there was 
simply no agreement between the parties 
as to the allocation of proceeds in the event 
that Dixie Six failed to develop the proper 
ty as required by the agreement 
Absent a meeting of the minds on how to 
divide the proceeds in the event of sale 
without development, Dixie Six has no 
clear contractual right to recover anything 
in excess of the agreed commission and 
expense reimbursement Nonetheless, 
Scheller concedes that Dixie Six may be 
entitled to some sort of equitable remedy. 
Quantum Meruit 
The trial court, considering it had no 
alternative method of compensation, deter-
mined it had to either award Dixie Six no 
additional compensation whatsoever or a 
full 60% of the profit from the sale of the 
property. It chose the latter rather than 
leave Dixie Six uncompensated for its ef-
forts; While ire agree with the trial court 
that it would be unfair to allow Scheller to 
profit from the work done by Dixie Six in 
anticipation of development, we do not 
agree that the only alternative is to give 
Dixie Six a 60% share of the net proceeds 
from the sale. 
When a party, for some reason, is not 
entitled by the express terms of a contract 
to recover payment for services rendered* 
he or she might nonetheless be entitled to 
recover in quantum meruit Davit* «. 01-
8CHELLBR v. DIXIE SIX CORP. Utah f f g 
C*aw7SS WM f71 (UtailApp. IftS) 
The trial court $o% 746 P.2d 264, 2«5 (Utah CtApp.1987) 
Recovery under quantum meruit presup-
poses that no enforceable contract exists. 
Id. In this case, while the parties entered 
into a contract, no contract existed m 
the allocation of proceeds in the event I i 
property was sold undeveloped. 
Quantum meruit h&a two distinct branch-
es, both rooted in justice to prevent one 
party's enrichment at the other's expense. 
Id. at 269. The first branch, contract im-
plied in law or "quasi-contract," is really 
not a contract at all, but rather an action in 
restitution. Id "The elements of a quasi-
contract, or a contract implied in law are: 
(1) the defendant received a benefit; (2) an 
appreciation or knowledge by the defend-
ant of the benefit; (3) under circumstances 
that would make it unjust for the defend-
ant to retain the benefit without paying for 
i t" Id. Recovery under quasi-contract or 
contract implied in law is measured by the 
value of the benefit conferred on the de-
fendant and not by the detriment incurred 
by the plaintiff or, necessarily, the reason-
able value of the plaintiffs services. Id 
The second branch of quantum meruit 
contract implied in fact >* an actual con-
tract established by conduct Id. The ele-
ments of a contract implied in fact are: (1) 
the defendant requested the plaintiff to 
perform the work; (2) the plaintiff expect-
ed the defendant to compensate him or her 
for those services; and (3) the defendant 
knew or should have known that the plain-
tiff expected compensation. Id. Recovery 
in such cases is for the amount the parties 
can be said to have reasonably intended as 
the contract price. When the parties have 
left that amount unexpressed, courts will 
infer the amount to be the reasonable vmlut 
of the plaintiffs services. Id. 
[3] The conduct of the parties in this 
case established a contract implied in fact 
as to the allocation of proceeds if the prop-
erty was sold prior to development Schel-
ler requested Dixie Six to perform the 
work of developing the property which nec-
essarily involved the work of preparing 
plans, plats, and studies and securing gov-
ernmental approval for construction on the 
lite Likewise, Dixie Six clearly expected 
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to be compensated for these services. Fi-
nally, Scheller knew or should have known 
that Dixie Six expected compensation for 
these services beyond the 6% sales commis-
sion it would receive for just selling the 
property. 
It is reasonably clear that, in agreeing to 
the payment formula prescribed in the 
agreement, the parties contemplated that 
Dixie Six's 6% commission, a standard com-
mission rate in the real estate industry, 
would compensate it for its efforts in mar-
keting the property while the 50% share in 
the net profits would reward it for its ef-
forts in subdividing and developing the 
property. Thus, if there had been a mere 
sale, 6% of the selling price would repre-
sent an appropriate allocation to Dixie Six. 
However, while it cannot be said that Dixie 
Six satisfied its obligation to develop the 
property, the trial court nonetheless found 
that Dixie Six had expended efforts which 
enhanced the property, including acquiring 
plans for development of the property and 
obtaining governmental approval for devel-
opment in accordance with the plans. As 
explained above, Dixie Six is entitled to a 
recovery in quantum meruit for the reason-
able value of its non-sale efforts. 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment in-
sofar as it awards Dixie Six the reimburse-
ment of its expenses and a sale commission 
of 6%. The judgment is reversed insofar 
as it also allowed Dixie Six 50% of the net 
sale profits, with remand for a determina-
tion of the amount of additional compensa-
tion to which Dixie Six is entitled under a 
theory of quantum meruit The parties 
shall bear their own costs of appeal 
BILLINGS and GARFF, JJ„ concur. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
v. 
(Curtis OWENS, Defendant and 
Respondent. 
No. 870342-CA. 
ourt of Appeals of Utah 
April 29, 1988. 
Defendant was convicted it the Fourth 
District CouJL George E. Ball/, J., of theft 
of rented property, but the tonrt granted 
new trial. Th\ State appeafcd. The Court 
of Appeals, J«kson, J., 
could not appeal order 
Appeal dismayed. 
eld that State 
rating new trial. 
1. Criminal Law 
Motion for new^ 
mitted for correcting 
court, or for reviev 
SLI generally is per-
prrors made in trial 
L conviction obtained 
by unfair or unlawul methods. 
2. Criminal Law#e»9194 
Witness intimidation 
warrant new trill if it resi 
defendant's rigft to fair 
77-35-24(a). 
) 
prosecutor can 
in denial of 
U.CJL1953, 
3. Criminal Law «=»1024(7) 
In graxdmg a new trial, 
not, in sulntance, grant 
ment, but looked beyond record ' 
tor's and Jntness' affidavits and' 
proper, voaecutorial behavior 
new trJt and State could noti 
U.CJU958, 77-35-28; 
<® Dfid L Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Day 
apson, Asat Atty. Gen., Salt 
for the State. 
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rBefore JACKSON, BENCH and 
ilLUNGS, JJ. 
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Ron D A V I E 8 and Da n Mehi ill m 
Davi t s & Mehi ' C :i i • it: i: n mi :ti on. 
Plaintiffs and 1! !S' i i { i i: i i i::i iitii it tin 
¥ 
II iniiilh? R. OLSON, I \ illiam 8. Lund, 
"i "i " iich Bank, Utah V alley Bank, and 
Household Finance Corporation De 
fendanU and Appellants. 
Ron DA VIES and Dan Mehi , dl < , 
Davies & Mehr Construction, 
Plaintiff! and Appellants, 
i 
Timothy R. OLSON, William S. Lm id, 
Wasatch Bank, Utah Valley Bank, and 
Household Finance Corporation, De-
fendants and Respondents. 
Nos. S60145-CA, 86014&-CA. 
Court of Appeals of I Jtah 
Nov. 24, 1987 
'
,rtn
-
tw,
"
t,rtr
 ~"~* •*•" brought action 
*or servic-
es ui cunsuiicung uupiexes. me Fourth 
District Court, Utah County, Robert J. 
Bullock, J., found in favor of construction 
company, and both parties appealed The 
Court of Appeals, Billings, J., held that (1) 
there was no enforceable written or oral 
contract absent meeting of minds as to 
contract price; (2) owners were not denied 
due process due to fact that judgment was 
based on quantum meruit, theory which 
was not pled; and (8) statutory interest 
was calculable from date on which owner 
signed settlement statement used for clos-
ing on financing. 
Affirmed in part, .reversed in part and 
remanded. 
1. Contracts *»28(ft) 
Finding that there was no enforceable 
written or oral contract between owner and 
contractor was supported by evidence that 
parties did not agree on contract price and 
that contractor never signed proposed con-
tract 
:2 Accord and Satisfaction *»4 
Settlement statement fixing sale under 
construction contract which was used for 
closing on financing did not constitute "ex-
ecutory accord," because there was no 
meeting of 'the minds, 
3 T i full €=•€{!) 
Hearing in civil action must be pref-
aced by timely notice which adequately in-
forms parties of specific issues they must 
be prepared to meet 
4. Pleading *=»427 
Issues not expressly raised in plead-
ings may be tried by implied consent of 
parties 
5 Constitutional Law e » 810 
1 i :: c f" :: f q uasi-con tract under allega-
tion of breach of express contract does not 
violate due process, absent surprise or prej-
udice I I S.C.A. ConstAmend 14. 
6. Constitutional La* i 31 CI 
Pleading *-»427 
Defendants in breach of contract ac-
tion were not denied due process due to 
trial court's award of damages based on 
unpled theory of quantum meruit, where 
supplemental hearing focused on plans and 
specifications underlying cost breakdown 
under construction contract, and on addi-
tional costs plaintiffs incurred because of 
defendant's requested changes in specifica-
tions U&CJL ConstAmend. 14. 
1 Appeal and Error *»H78i*) 
In contractor's action to recover for 
coats incurred in constructing duplexes, 
judgment which awarded contractor dam-
ages based on theory of quantum meruit, 
but which gave owner credit for prior judg-
ment baaed on initial cost breakdown was 
inconsistent, and required remand for de-
termination of damages under quantum 
meruit 
S npueo and Construct!?! Contracts 
Recovery under quantum meruit 
supposes that no enforceable written, > :>r 
oral contract exists . 
9. Implied and Constructs Contracts 
Elements of "quasi-contract," or con-
tract implied in law, are: defendant re-
ceived benefit; appreciation or knowledge 
by defendant of benefit; under circum-
stances that would make it unjust for de-
fendant to retain benefit without paying 
for it 
Sec publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
10. Implied and Constructive Contracts 
<t=»110 
Measure of recovery under quasi-con-
tract, or contract implied in law, is value of 
benefit conferred on defendant, and not 
detriment incurred by plaintiff, or neces-
sarily reasonable value of plaintiffs servic-
es. 
11. Contracts «»27 
Elements of "contract implied in fact" 
are: defendant requested plaintiff to per-
form work; plaintiff expected defendant to 
compensate him or her for those services; 
and defendant knew or should have known 
that plaintiff expected compensation. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other Judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
12. Interest «»37(1) 
Statutory legal rate of interest is ap-
plied from date payment is due to judg-
ment date. U.CJL 1968, 15-1-1. 
13. interest *»SM1S0) 
" Day on which settlement statement 
was signed which wis used at doting on 
financing for construction project was day 
that owner acknowledged obligation to pay 
contractor for .services in constructing do-, 
plexesrand determination of interest due 
thus began on that date. U.CJL 1968, 
15-1- 1. 
Dallas H. Young, Jr., Jerry L Reynolds, 
Provo, for defendants ipd appelant*. 
Gary D. Stott, Lynn & Dsries, SaltUke 
City, for defendants and-respondent*^ 
1. The finttrtal was held on A * u * & 1912 and 
September 13,I9S2. The iippirmtnts! hearing 
was held on April 4. 1965, April 10, 1965, and 
v, VLOun uuui £QQ 
MdHaliAty. IfS7) 
Before GARFF, ORME mnd 
BILLINGS, JJ. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Both parties appeal from the trial court's 
May 17, 1985 judgment against defendant 
Olson, purporting to award plaintiffs their 
reasonable costs (plus interest) incurred in 
constructing four duplexes for defendants. 
We affirm t..o trial court's finding that 
there was no contract, and the court's con-
clusion that quantum meruit was, there-
fore, the proper theory of recovery. We, 
however, reverse the finding of no liability 
on the part of defendant Lund. We re-
mand for findings as to whether he (1) 
requested plaintiffs to perform work and if 
so, to what extent, and/or (2) received any 
benefits as a result of plaintiffs' construc-
tion of the duplexes, and an entry of a 
judgment consistent with those findings 
and our opinion. We further reverse the 
trial court's calculation of damages against 
defendant Olson and remand for a determi-
nation of the reasonable value of plaintiffs' 
services in constructing the duplexes, and 
an entry of a judgment in that amount 
against defendant Olson. 
FACTS 
The following facts were developed in a 
bifurcated trial held on five nonconsecutive 
days over a two-year 4ight-month period.1 
Plaintiff Davies and defendant Olson orally 
agreed that Davies would construct four 
duplexes for Olson. The parties originally 
agreed that plaintiff Davies would con-
struct the duplexes for "cost phis $6,000 
builder's profit per duplex." Based on this 
oral agreement, plaintiff Davies prepared a 
cost breakdown and submitted it to Was* 
atch Bank for acquisition of long-term fi-
nancing, and to defendant Olson.,. Subse-
quently, defendant Olson requested numer-
ous changes and additions to the original 
specifications for the duplexes. 
Soon thereafter, defendants, in an at-
tempt to establishes ceiling price on the 
April 16,19S5. The confusion and Inconsisten-
cies in the judgment are largely attributable to 
the unfortunate interruptions in the trial. 
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cost of construction at $72,070 per duplex, 
prepared a contract and submitted it to 
plaintiffs. In his letter to plaintiffs, de-
fendant Olson stated that the purpose of 
the p.-oposed contract was "mainly to satis-
fy [defendant] Lund" as he was concerned 
about fixing a ceiling price. This contract, 
however, was never executed. 
A settlement statement, dated July 7, 
1981 and signed by defendant Lund, fixed 
the contract sales price at $128,500. This 
settlement statement was used at the clos-
ing with Wasatch Bank. Wasatch Bank 
provided permanent financing, which was 
insufficient to cover plaintiffs' construction 
expenses. Consequently, plaintiffs initi-
ated an action against, among others, de-
fendants Olson and Lund, alleging claims 
of fraud, breach of contract, and fore-
closure of mechanics' liens. (The fore-
closure claim was resolved), 
After the initial trial on August 2, 1982 
and September IS, 1982, the trial court 
entered judgment on August 4, 1988 
against defendants Lund and Olson for 
$28,741.64 * plus 12% interest accruing 
from July 7, 1981. The court found there 
was no agreement among the parties as to 
the total price to be paid for the construc-
tion of the duplexes. The court, however, 
based on the initial cost breakdown pre-
pared by plaintiff Davies, found defendants 
jointly liable for $28,741.54. The court 
then found that plaintiffs were additionally 
entitled to Tccover from defendant Olson 
the reasonable costs incurred because of 
defendant Olson's requested changes to the 
duplex specifications.1 The court then di-
rected counsel to negotiate and submit a 
figure as to the reasonable costs plaintiffs 
incurred'because of defendant Olson's re-
quested changes. The parties failed to 
reach an agreement Consequently/a sup-
plemental hearing w a s held on April 4, 
1985, April 10, 1985, and April 16, 1985, 
2. The court found the cost per duplex to be 
$71495. Multiplying that figure by the number 
of duplexes built (4), and subtracting the con-
tttuctiofi costs paid by defendants, f269,£3S«46V 
yielded a judgment in the amount of $23,74134. 
I. The court did not enter Judgment against de-
fendant Lund for this additional recovery, find-
focusing on the following issuei • prai ' i« H I ill) 
reserved by the trial court 
1. What were the plans and specifica-
tions upon which plaintiffs and de-
fendants relied in the cost break-
down? 
9 W^lfit «r"vHi/i/»« 
i'„ were Uie **asonable -* -'* 
requested modifications * 
e actually made by plaintiff 
The trial court, in its final judgment of 
May found there was no meeting 
of the munis between the parties "as to 
plans and specifications which formed the1 
basis of the cost breakdown/1 and, there-' 
fore, that it erred in basing its August 4 f' 
1983 judgment on that document The* 
court concluded that in order to prevent; 
unjust enrichment of defendant Olson, 
plaintiffs were entitled to recover their rea-s 
sonable costs of construction from him^ 
The court, however, was silent as to de>0 
fendant Lund's liability. The court award-, 
ed plaintiffs $51,778.96 plus interest "at£ 
the legal rate of interest," accruing from 
July 7 ,1981, the date the settlement state-
ment was executed. The trial court calcu-
lated the May 17, 1986 judgment as fol-r 
lows: 
Remsooablt eost of eoostroctioo ISSS.mM ^ 
Lsst ft^fcstflMnt for wstsr mttert 1,380.00 Jffl 
NET CONSTRUCTION COST 3*6^68.9*
 ( , 
LMI the Amount of the August 4 ~*J 
Jodgasat* B18,iS0.00 
MsyW, lMJadgMttePNot l f f s IM/TTU*^ 
Both parties appeal from the May 17,1988] 
judgment. 
I SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
[ 1 ] On appeal, w e are asked to deterj 
mine whether there is sufficient evidence 
to support the trial court's finding of s o 
enforceable written or oral contract The 
tag that defendant Lund merely assisted defasjk 
ant Olson in acquiring long-term financing. 
meat of f 7I49S per duplex, multiplied by the 
number of duplexes bulk (4), or tt 13,510, Sw 
Note 1, suprM. 
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trial court's findings of fact will not be set 
aside unless "clearly erroneous/' Utah 
RCiv.P. 52(a); State v. Wright, 744 P.2d 
316 (Utah CtApp.1987); State v. Walker, 
743 P.2d 191, 198 (Utah 1987). A'review of 
the record amply supports the trial court's 
findings (1) that there was no meeting of 
the minds as to the contract price, an es-
sential term of a construction contract; (2) 
that there was no meeting of the minds as 
to which plans and specifications formed 
the basis of the cost breakdown prepared 
by plaintiff Davies; and (8) that the parties 
did not intend the settlement statement to 
constitute an executory accord. 
Testimony at trial conflicted significantly 
as to the contract price. Plaintiff Davies 
testified that he and defendant Olson orally 
agreed that plaintiff Davies would con-
struct the four duplexes for cost plus 
$6,000 builder's profit per duplex. Defend-
ant Olson, on the other hand, while con-
ceding that cost plus $6,000 was discussed, 
denied that he agreed to an open-ended 
deal Subsequent to the oral conversation 
between plaintiff Davies and defendant Ol-
son, plaintiff Davies prepared a cost break-
down and submitted it to Wasatch Bank 
and to defendant Olson, Thereafter, de-
fendant Olson prepared a written contract 
with a provision that coat was not to ex-
ceed $72,070 per duplex, evidently attempt* 
ing to appease defendant Lund's concern 
about^cost Defendant Olson presented 
thif proposed contract tq pjaintjff .Dajriia, 
claiming Davies said that he would sigitit 
This contimc^^i^^^iraa nevqp « * • 
cuted. 
Given the disparity innthe testimony i»» 
garding the contract price, the trial court's 
finding that there was 4o .meeting of the 
minds as *to the contract price tenotxleariy 
erroneous.: 
[2] We also siflra the trkJcourt'i find-
ing that the settlement statement nsed for 
dosing on the financfag <Bd bbtfobo^ftirte 
an '•saacutmy a^ort/1 Waus4 there jriuf 
no meeting of the minds. See'OcUMKey 
Realty, Inc. * Manias, «99 PA* m 788 
(Utah 1986); Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. 
Anderson, 610 PJM1869,1872 flJtah 1980). 
The settlement statement Usts the contract 
v. OLoon 
MOMikAff. IM7) 
price as $128,600. At trial, conflicting tes-
timony was introduced regarding whether 
defendant Olson ever agreed to this figure. 
Defendant Olson testified that he never 
agreed to a contract price in excess of 
$116,000 per unit Similarly, defendant 
Lund's position is that he signed the settle-
ment statement merely to assist defendant 
Olson to acquire long-term financing, but 
that the sett lament statement did not con-
stitute an acknowledgment of specific 
amounts owed to plaintiffs. After review-
ing the record, we do not believe the trial 
court's finding that the parties did not in-
tend the settlement statement to constitute 
an executory accord is clearly erroneous. 
II. DUE PROCESS 
Defendants contend that they were de-
nied due process of law because the trial 
court'8 May 17, 1985 judgment was based 
on quantum meruit, a theory which was 
not pled, nor reserved by the trial court 
We disagree. 
[3-6] A hearing must be prefaced by 
timely notice which adequately informs the 
parties of the specific issues they must be 
prepared to meet Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 
P.2d 1207, 1212 (Utah 1988). Issues not 
expressly raised in the pleadings, however, 
may be tried by the implied consent of the 
parties. General Ins. Co. v. Carnicero 
Dynasty Corp., 646 P.2d 602, 606 (Utah 
1976). Implied consent may be fou^d 
where evidence is introduced without objec-
tion. Id Moreover, proof of a quasi-con-
tract under an allegation of a breach of an 
express contract does not violate due pro-
cess, absent surprise or prejudice/ North 
Tillamook County Sanitary Authority v. 
Great American / * * £ & , 46 Or-App. 178, 
6U PJ2d,319, 821 (1980). 
t«l Quantum metuit wis, at least in-
ferentiaDy, an issue at the supplemental 
hearing:' The supplemental hearing fo-
cused on the plans and specifications un-
derlying the cost breakdown and the addi-
tional costs plaintiffs incurred because of 
defendant Olson's requested changes in the 
duplex specifications. There ia no showing 
that defendants were surprised or prevent-
ed from presenting all evidence pertaining 
to the reasonable costs of construction or 
the benefits defendants received, nor that 
they \^ ere prejudiced by the trial judge 
relying on the theory of quantum meruit 
Furthermore, any possible prejudice de-
fendants may have suffered is cured by 
our remand for a new trial on the issue of 
damages. 
III. DEFENDANT LUND'S LIABILITY 
The trial court, in its final May 17, 1985 
judgment, without any supportive findings 
or explanation, relieved defendant Lund of 
liability. The court did this although it had 
previously held him liable for the $28,-
741.54 judgment. We are unable to ascer-
tain whether the court found that defend-
ant Lund requested plaintiffs to perform 
services, and if so, to what extent, or 
whether any benefit was conferred upon 
defendant Lund by plaintiffs' construction 
of the duplexes. If defendant Lund re-
quested services and received a benefit 
which would be unjustly retained, he is 
liable under quantum meruit* Conse-
quently, we remand to the trial court for 
findings on this issue and an entry of judg-
ment consistent with our opinion. 
IV. MEASURE OF DAMAGES 
Despite our approval of the trial court's 
decision to base recovery on quantum m+ 
ruity we, nonetheless, reverse the May ,17,. 
1985 Judgment because we find that it is 
legAfty and factually inconsistent' 
In its August 4,1988 judgment,, the trial 
court based.plaintiffs' damages on the coat 
breakdown jand held Mbdefendants liable. 
[7] In its May 17, 1986 Judgment, the 
court determined that there was no meet-
ing of the minds as to the plans and specifi-
cations underlying thf cost breakdown, re-
versing jts prior conclusion. The court, 
therefore, premised its May 17,1986 Judg-
ment strictly on quantum meruit None-
theless, in calculating the measure'of dam-
5. Of court*, the court, on remand, could find 
other theories of recovery afjaintt defendant 
Lund bated upon the evidence, including part-
nership or joint venture; 
ages assessed against defendant Olson, the 
court gave defendant Olson credit for the 
August 4, 1988 judgment-* judgment 
based on a theory that the court had reject-
ed. Further, the court did not indicate 
whether defendant Lund was still bound by 
the earlier judgment entered against him. 
By giving defendant Olson credit for the 
August 4, 1988 judgment, an earlier judg-
ment which the May 17, 1985 judgment, on 
its face, seems to supercede, the trial court, 
in effect, reduced the amount of plaintiffs' 
recovery. The trial court did not indicate 
whether it intended the May 17, 1985 judg-
ment to be in addition to the August 4, 
1983 judgment, or instead of it1 In light 
of these observations, we find that the May 
17,1985 judgment is internally inconsistent 
and, if enforced, patently unfair to plain-
tiffs under any interpretation of the evi-
dence. Therefore, we reverse and remand 
for a determination of damages under 
quantum meruit 
[8] Because we remand for further pro-
ceedings, we attempt to provide some guid-
ance to the trial court See Utah Farm 
Production Credit AssSi v. Watts, 787 
P.2d 164, 158 (Utah 1987). Quantum me-
ruit is an action initiated by a plaintiff to 
recover payment for labor performed in a 
variety of circumstances in which that 
plaintiff, for some reason, would not be 
able to sue ton an express contract Recov-
ery under quantum meruit presupposes 
that no enforceable written or oral contract 
exists. See Blue Ridge S^oer Improve-
ment Diet v. Lowry £ Ae$oe.f Inc., 149 
Ariz. 878, 718 ?J2d 1026 (CtApp.1986). 
Confusion surrounds the use and applica-
tion of quantum meruit see, e.p., Inter-
form Oktv. Mitckell, 676 PM 1270 (9th 
Or»tt78) {attempting to apply Idaho law); 
Hartwell Corp. % Smith, 107. Idaho J84, 
686.i\2d 79 (CtApp.1934)^ because courts 
have used the terms quantum meruit, 
contract implied in fact, contract implied in 
law, quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, 
and/or restitution without analytical pred-
6. The earlier Judgment was ttot made Anal pur-
suant to Utah RJOV J>. 84(b) and therefore 
would seem to be legally merged Into or super* 
ceded by the May 17 final Judgment 
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•k>n. See, eg., Euramca Ecosys v. Roedi-
ger Pittsburgh, Inc., 581 F.Supp,416, 422 
(E.D.111.1984) (discussing • quasi-contract 
claim in quantum meruit litigation); Ida-
ho Lumber, Inc. v. Buck, 109 Idaho 787, 
710 P.2d 647, 855-57 (CtApp.1985); Sharp 
v. Laubershetmer, 847 N.W.2d 268, 270 
(Minn.1984); Ellis-Jonts, Inc. v. Western 
Waterproofing Co., 66 N.C.App. 641, 646-
47, 312 S.E.2d 215, 218 (1984). 
Quantum meruit has two distinct 
branches. Both branches, however, are 
rooted in "justice," $ee Lakeehore Fin. 
Corp. v. Comstock, 587 F.Supp. 426, 429 
(W.D.Mich.1984), to prevent the defend-
ant's enrichment at the plaintiffs expense. 
See Haxelwood Water Diet v. First Union 
Management, Inc., 78 Or.App. 226, 715 
P.2d 498 (1986). 
[9,10] Contract implied in law, also 
known as quasi-contract or unjust enrich-
ment, is one branch of quantum meruit 
A quasi-contract is not a contract at all, but 
rather is a legal action in restitution. See 1 
A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts i 19, at 
44,46 (1968). The elements of a quasi-con-
tract, or a contract implied in law, are: (1) 
the defendant received a benefit; (2) an 
appreciation or knowledge by the defend-
ant of the benefit; (8) under circumstances 
that would make it unjust for the (defend-
ant to retain,the benefit without paying for 
it -See BerreU * Steven* 690 ?M 568, 
557,(Utah 1984) (using the* t^J'unjust 
enrichment")* / The fsmqasurt'Of recovery 
under quasi-contract, or contract implied in 
law, it the value of the benefit conferred on 
the defendant ttiU ^ A d « i ^ lftitiS and 
not tl*1detriment incurred by the plaintiff, 
$**inr$tfnvr(ti\:AndJr*nf~m ?J2& 
eSS," 687 (Utah 1980),^ necessarily the 
reasonable vahe of Ae S t i f f s services. 
second branch fp^quantun meruit' A, 
contract implied in titfk a "contraoT es-
tablished by conduct' See Restatement 
(Second) of (Mn^^^^atiOiimh 
^1981). JThe elements of * contract Implied 
in-faot ami (1) the defendant requested the 
plaintiff to perform work; <2) the iplafatiff 
expected the defendant to compensate torn 
or her for those senrtoes;^ and (8) the de-
fcMOUBOW Utah 269 
4(UtafaA*p. Ift7) 
fendant knew or should have known that 
the plaintiff expected compensation; See 
Kints v. Read, 28 Wash.App. 781, 626 P.2d 
52, 55 (1981); see also Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts 5 5 comment a (1981) 
(providing that terms of promise or agree-
ment are those expressed in language of 
parties or implied in fact from other con-
duct); 1 S Williaton, Williston on Con-
tracts § 3, at 8-10 (1957) (defining implied 
in fact contracts as obligations arising 
from mutual agreement and intent to prom-
ise where parties do not express agreement 
and promise in words); 1 A. Corbin, Corbin 
on Contracts § 18 (1963) (noting that im-
plied contracts impose contractive duty by 
reason of promissory expression and are no 
different than express contracts, although 
different in mode of expressing assent). 
'Technically, recovery in contract implied 
in fact is the amount the parties intended 
as the contract price. If that amount is 
unexpressed, courts will infer that the par-
ties intended the amount to be the reason-
able market value of the plaintiffs servic-
es." Kovacic, A Proposal to Simpltfy 
Quantum Meruit Litigation, 85 Am.U.L. 
Rev. 547, 556 (1986). 
In the case before us, the trial court 
correctly found that there was no express 
contract, and thus that plaintiffs' recovery 
must be based on quantum meruit The 
cooft farther held that plaintiffs should 
recover their reasonable coats of construct* 
ing the duplexes. The court correctly 
found a contract implied in- fact It is 
ugdjmted tha^fofendant Olson orally re-
qqested, plaintiff Daviea, to construct the 
duplets, .t^tjjbdntif^ expected Olson to 
comoinsata them for those, services, and 
that Olson knew that plaintiffs expected 
compensation. Thus, we remand as to de-
fendant Olson for a ^^termination of the 
reasonable vmfoe of p ^ in 
constructing the duplexes, and an entry of 
Judgment against him for that amount 
We are unahle-to determfc* what the 
court found as to^d^encIalit^Lund. Thus 
we remand as to defendant land for find-
ings on whether he requested plaintiffs to 
perform work, and if so, to what extent or 
whether he received any unjust benefits as 
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a result of platottfh'efforts. These find-
ings will support the court's conclusion as 
to whether defendant Lund is liable to 
plaintiffs under quantum meruit-* con-
tract > nplied in law, or quantum meruit 
—a contract implied in fact, or neither. As 
is explained more fully fupra, the measure 
of damages may differ depending on the 
theory adopted. 
V INTEREST 
In awarding damages, the applicable le-
gal rate of interest must also be deter-
mined. The 1981 amendment to section 
16-1-1 increased the legal rate of interest 
from 6 percent to 10 percent Utah Code 
Ann. § 16-1-1 (1986). 
[12] The statutory legal rate of interest 
is applied from the date payment is due to 
the judgment date. See Lignell v. Berg, 
598 P.2d 800, 809 (Utah 1979). 
[18] The trial court found July 7, 1981, 
the date defendant Lund signed the settle-
ment statement, as the due date, as that 
was the date the benefit was conferred. It 
was also on this date that defendants ac-
knowledged an obligation to pay plaintiffs 
for their services in constructing the du-
plexes. We fiixi that this determination is 
supported by substantial evidence and 
therefore will not disturb it on appeaL See 
id. at 810. Based on this factual determi-
nation, we find the appropriate xatextf in-
terest is 10 percent 
The^MayVT, 1985 Judgtoffltis affittned 
in part and marked in pertHTbe <*&* 
remanded fbr further proceedings Ctittswfr 
ent withthii'opinion, 'fiach'pajrty to bear 
o w n COStS. 
GARFF^end^RME, JJ. 
(o inrMMHi 
«5P 
The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
v. 
^Rick PURSIFELL, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 860361-CA. 
Durt of Appeals of Utah. 
Dec. 2, 1987. 
Defendant was convicted by juryln the 
Third Distant Court Salt Lake Couf ty, J. 
Dennis Frederick, J., of burglary, Atempt-
ed burglary,uheft and vehicle furglary, 
and defendant appealed, alleg 
denied Sixth Amendment right; 
assistance of ciunseL The 
peals, Orme, J. Aeld that (l\ 
inquiry into defendant's 
satisfaction withi 
was sufficient; (2Adefend 
did not warrant si 
and (8) defendant fI 
of proving ineffe 
seL 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law 
Indigent defe 
right to appoint 
stHutional Tight 
appointed, 
ConstAxnend. 
2. Criminal ^;#^414<K2)llltt(l) 
,. .,,. „ J%W89H^Wpii»>wyer 
for ind^nudefend^nt who axamsas dis-
withroourtd^pofarts* counsel, 
but has TA constitutional right t \ appoint-
meot of different lawyer^ is i 
ted to s#2nd discretion ox trial ooArt u d 
will be/eversed only for Jabuse ta\ 
tkm. JJ.S.CA. ConstAmend.6. 
torn* 
S. C^bbml Law * - * 4 U « t ) 
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i against competing ooocern about 1 
